Antibes english summary
At 16:10 on Monday, 26 December 2016, in the Antibes station, TER No. 86036 Ventimiglia Cannes ran through, at a speed of 15 km/h, a track switch located on the main AN2 track and positioned to allow the crossing of a TGV arriving on the central rail.
The impact was the consequence of crossing the C1324 signal, which was closed and was not observed by the conductor.
Poorly informed by the conductor, the Antibes signalman believed it was a functional failure of the installations of the switch station and continued to operate his station.
The TER conductor continued his task and would only find out the next day, when investigations showed he had crossed the signal.
The TGV, which was arriving 5 minutes later, stopped as normal at the signal protecting the tswitch, which was now out of service. He continued his route using another itinerary.
There were no victims or damage to rolling stock material. Only the impacted switch was damaged, rendering crossing impossible and thus, circulation on the AN2 track.
The impact was the immediate consequence of crossing the closed signal. Crossing the closed signal was the result of the TER conductor not observing the point protection signal. Nevertheless, a collision accident between the TGV and TER was avoided.
Numerous loopbacks didn’t function :
- the speed control automated system (KVB) which was out of service following a software failure on the train ;
- the signal detonator, whose cartridge had exploded and was not perceived by the conductor ;
- the “closed signal” repetition in the cabin that should have led the conductor to initiate emergency braking.
Furthermore, the handling of the situation by the signalman was not adequate.
The analysis of this situation led BEA-TT to make two recommendations in the following areas :
- the processing of computer bugs disturbing the functioning of KVB on the SN Regio material ;
- the ability of new traffic agents to handle complex situations.